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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 David and Megan Mulholland appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their 
complaint for failure to comply with New Jersey’s affidavit-of-merit statute.  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-26 to -29.  We will affirm. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 
only the essential facts and procedural history. 
 In 2009, David received a transplanted kidney from a donor who, prior to the 
surgery, had tested positive for cytomegalovirus (CMV).  David and his wife, Megan, 
tested negative for the virus.  David could have received a kidney from Megan, but 
ultimately chose the other donor so that Megan would be able to donate a kidney to their 
son if he someday needed it.  Before he consented to the surgery, David had been told of 
the serious risk of CMV infection associated with the transplant procedure, but not of the 
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different CMV test results.  For more than two years following the transplant, David 
suffered complications from a CMV infection, which ended with the removal of the 
transplanted kidney.  Megan also contracted CMV during this period. 
 David and Megan filed a diversity suit against Thomas Jefferson University 
Hospital, Inc., where the transplant was performed, and against several medical 
professionals who were involved in transplanting the kidney and treating David 
(collectively, Defendants).  The amended complaint alleges five counts—lack of 
informed consent, assault and battery, professional malpractice, negligence, and 
fraudulent misrepresentation—but the Mulhollands abandoned all but the first and last 
claims during the course of litigation in the District Court.  The District Court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to satisfy the affidavit-of-merit requirement,1
                                                 
 1 The affidavit-of-merit statute provides in pertinent part: 
 and the 
Mulhollands timely filed a notice of appeal. 
 
In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property 
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a 
licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 
days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the 
defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate 
licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill 
or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that 
is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or 
occupational standards or treatment practices.  The court may grant no 
more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit 
pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. 
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II 
 We will affirm largely for the reasons stated by the District Court, whose decision 
we subject to plenary review.  Newell v. Ruiz, 286 F.3d 166, 167 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
Mulhollands offer two arguments for reversal.  First, they contend that under New Jersey 
law, an affidavit is not required to proceed with a lack-of-informed-consent or fraudulent-
misrepresentation claim.  In the alternative, they assert that they substantially complied 
with the affidavit requirement. 
 We squarely rejected the first argument in Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 
154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2000), holding that under New Jersey law, an affidavit is a 
necessary predicate to a lack-of-informed-consent action.  We are permitted to reconsider 
this holding “‘in light of intervening authority,’ including intervening decisions of state 
law [by] its highest court.”  Covell v. Bell Sports, Inc., 651 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996)).  The Mulhollands 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the case of an action for medical malpractice, the person executing the 
affidavit shall meet the requirements of a person who provides expert 
testimony or executes an affidavit as set forth in section 7 of P.L. 2004, c. 
17 (C.2A:53A-41).  In all other cases, the person executing the affidavit 
shall be licensed in this or any other state; have particular expertise in the 
general area or specialty involved in the action, as evidenced by board 
certification or by devotion of the person’s practice substantially to the 
general area or specialty involved in the action for a period of at least five 
years.  The person shall have no financial interest in the outcome of the 
case under review, but this prohibition shall not exclude the person from 
being an expert witness in the case. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27. 
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proffer a few New Jersey Supreme Court precedents addressing the affidavit requirement 
since Chamberlain, see Couri v. Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134 (N.J. 2002); Palanque v. 
Lambert-Woolley, 774 A.2d 501 (N.J. 2001); Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 
495 (N.J. 2001), but none of these cases considered the affidavit requirement as applied 
to a lack-of-informed-consent claim.  Accordingly, Chamberlain controls our disposition 
here.  Because the evidence necessary to prove fraudulent misrepresentation in this case 
would be nearly identical to that needed to show lack of informed consent, Chamberlain 
also disposes of the Mulhollands’ second cause of action. 
 As the Mulhollands were subject to the affidavit requirement, the only remaining 
question is whether they complied with it.  They forthrightly concede that their affidavit 
was untimely, and we agree with the District Court that their affiant, a family medicine 
practitioner, does not meet the expertise standard found in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-27.  
The Mulhollands argue under the New Jersey Supreme Court’s doctrine of “substantial 
compliance” that they should be excused from this failure.  See Ferreira v. Rancocas 
Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 783 (N.J. 2003) (discussing the five-part substantial-
compliance test).  That Court has applied this doctrine where a medical-malpractice 
defendant’s name was omitted from the affidavit, which was otherwise “timely served” 
and accompanied by “an extensive medical expert’s report that clearly focused on his 
conduct and on the totality of the circumstances attending” the alleged tort, Fink v. 
Thompson, 772 A.2d 386, 394–95 (N.J. 2001), and in another case where “plaintiff’s 
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counsel obtained a detailed expert’s report verifying the legitimacy of the claim long 
before filing the complaint, immediately shared it with defendant’s carriers, and engaged 
in settlement discussions with defendants based on the report,” Galik v. Clara Maass 
Med. Ctr., 771 A.2d 1141, 1152 (N.J. 2001).  Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, the 
Mulhollands can show neither a lack of prejudice to Defendants, who may be held liable 
if we accept the substantial-compliance argument and who were not timely “notified . . . 
about the merits of the . . . claims filed against them,” Palanque, 774 A.2d at 506, nor a 
reasonable explanation for noncompliance.  The District Court correctly held that the 
Mulhollands did not substantially comply with the affidavit requirement.2
III 
 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm. 
                                                 
 2 The Mulhollands also invoke the “extraordinary circumstances” exception 
recognized in Ferreira, 836 A.2d at 783, but because they address it for the first time in 
their reply brief, the argument has been waived.  E.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). 
